The performance of family-owned firms has been driven by factors relating to family ownership, family leadership, and external supervision. In this paper, we offer an empirical study investigating the effects of those corporate governance concerns. To serve the purpose, we conducted a survey on 121 Chinese family-owned firms over the period of 2012-2014. Using pooled ordinary least square technique we find that family leadership and external supervision significantly influence the firms' Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) whereas family ownership significantly influences ROA, but not ROE. Findings also indicate that firm size, total assets, and solidity have significant impact on ROA and ROE. Discussing our findings in light of stewardship and agency theories, we especially supplement stewardship theory due to the close alignment between owners and managers in family-owned firms.
Introduction
In many countries, family-owned firms are crucial pillars of the economy. While the literature still lacks a clear definition of family-owned firms (Handler 1989; Winter, Fitzgerald, Heck, Haynes, & Danes, 1998) , these Family-owned firms like to maintain family control (Litz, 1995) , in the form of unique, inseparable, synergistic resources and capabilities (Habbershon, Williams, & MacMillan, 2003) , thereby resulting in strategic decision making through family influences (Davis & Tagiuri, 1989 , Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999 .
Major operating decisions and plans for leadership succession are influenced by family members in management or on the board (Donckels & Froehlich, 1991; International Family Enterprise Research Academy, 2003; Pistrui, Huang, Oksoy, Jing, & Welsch, 2001) . The performance of family-owned firms is driven by family and business factors (Berent-Braun & Uhlaner, 2012; Dyer, 2006) . A dyadic relationship between family and business reflects upon the existence of reciprocal economic and noneconomic values in family and business systems (Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005; Concerning the board structure, previous research underlines that sufficient outside, non-executive ('independent') directors on the board, who are willing and able to monitor executive performance, improve firm performance (Bhagat et al., 2008; Nguyen & Nielsen, 2009) . Castillo and Wakefield (2006) find that a firm owner's perceived satisfaction with firm performance is positively related to the number of non-family board members, albeit the found significance was rather weak. In family-owned firms, especially family members in the executive management team rely on outside directors to perform the board's control task (Bammens, Voordeckers, & van Gils, 2008) . However, the independence of outside directors in the context of family-owned firms can be questioned (Anderson & Reeb, 2003) . Further, stockholders may benefit more from inside boards (Harris & Raviv, 2008) . In this debate, we hypothesize:
H4. Having outside directors on the board positively affects the performance of family-owned firms.
Audit Committee. Overseeing the financial reporting and accounting, an audit committee with external auditors secures regulatory compliance and thus should support a firm's risk management (e.g., Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2004 ). An audit committee typically performs three key roles in corporate governance.
(1) It provides a platform apart from management where the accountants may discuss their concerns, (2) it accelerates communication flows among the board of directors, management, internal auditors, and independent accountants, and (3) it augments auditor independence from management by appointing, compensating, and overseeing the work of the independent accountants. However, Klein (2002) informs about a negative relationship between an audit committee's independence and firm performance. We hypothesize:
H5. Having an audit committee positively affects the performance of family-owned firms.
An audit committee generally has at least three members. Typically, two-thirds of the members are External Auditors in order to indicate the committee's independence, ensuring proper corporate governance practices. The chairman, appointed by the board, is usually one of the externals.
H6. Having external auditors on the audit committee positively affects the performance of familyowned firms. Since we measure performance through ROA and ROE, we model the relationships between each of the two dependent variables and the independent variables, and control variables as shown below. 
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Journal of Business and Management Research, July 2016, Vol. 1, No. 2 In the above model, Own stands for Ownership, the F-CEO represents Family CEO, B-size is for Board Size, O-Dir is for Outside directors on the Board, AuCom stands for Audit committee, O-AuCom is external auditors, Emp-ln is for total employees and measured by logarithm of total employees in the firm, Hr-M is for Human Resource Manager, F-Size-ln is for Firm Size and measured by logarithm of annual turnover, FixAssets-ln is for Fixed assets and measured by logarithm of fixed assets, TotAssetsln stands for total assets and measured by logarithm of total assets, Solidity-ln stands for solidity, NatFirm is for nature of the firm, and F-age stands for the variable firm age.
Statistical Approach
As Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE), we apply Generalized Least Squares (GLS) to test the relationship between firm performance and corporate governance, which incorporates information about the errors and thereby making up for the inefficiency of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Since our method of fusing cross-sectional and time series data is sensitive to heteroscedasticity, we use white heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors and covariance. To address the problem of heterogeneity we include firm specific dummies with Fixed Effects. We also use Random Effects to address the heterogeneity and Panel-Corrected Standard Errors to ensure preciseness in the variance across units.
To handle complex error structures in Panel data, we estimate the coefficients by OLS and then compute Panels Corrected Standard Errors (Beck, Katz 1995). Since we use OLS coefficients to produce estimates of the residuals, it is possible that biases in OLS coefficients lead to problems with estimating standard errors. Therefore, we employ a regression with Panels Corrected Standard Errors. The significance of the Panels Corrected Standard Errors depends on the consistency of OLS point estimates.
We estimate the model using STATA 9.1. We correct panel data regression for the serial autocorrelation by the Cochrane-Orcutt method (Gujarati, 1995) . The Hausman-Taylor estimation gives us the primary results. To examine the robustness of our main results, we estimate OLS with and without the control variables.
Data Collection
To test the above hypotheses, we collected primary data in China for 121 unlisted family-owned firms. We adopted purposive stratified random sampling to cherry-pick the family-owned firms. A structured questionnaire was sent, by means of email and also by post office, to the address of 150 family-owned firms. Among these 150 firms, 121 firms replied which means response rate was 81%. We collected data for same firms for the period of 2012-2014 in terms of Chinese currency and then to generalize findings worldwide, Chinese currency was converted into U.S. dollar at the prevailing rate. To that end, we used balanced panel data for 121 family-owned firms in 17 Chinese states spread across five different regions (see Table 2 ). We pooled cross sectional observations for 15 parameters over the year of 2012-2014.
Results
Out of the 121 firms studied, 86 (71%) are involved in manufacturing activities. Of the sampled firms, 67 (55%) have one family as single largest shareholder; the remaining 54 (45%) have two to four families as major shareholders. The average firm age of the sampled firms is about eleven years and the mean ROA and ROE are about 28% and 66% respectively. The average firm size is of the order of US$0.74
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Journal of Business and Management Research, July 2016, Vol. 1, No. 2 million annual turnover with an average net profit of about US$0.027 million. Sample firms have an average capital employed of US$0.46 million, average fixed assets of US$0.362 million, average total assets of US$0.248 million and an investment of US$0.255 million. (For the descriptive statistics, see Table A1 in Appendix 1). The average board size of the 121 firms studied is 10. The number of Outside Directors on the Board is about two. 89% of the firms are managed by family CEOs. The mean of the number of employees is around 56 persons; 54% of firms have a Human Resource Manager or equivalent. Around 87% of firms have Audit Committees, and81% of the firms studied have external members in their Audit Committee.
We ran our regressions separately for ROA and ROE as dependent variable as shown in the equations above ('Model I' and 'Model II').
As we used pooled data there might be presence of heteroscedasticity. Considering this issue, using Panels Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) we estimated the equations and findings are provided in Table  3 . Also, to account for the preciseness in the variance across the family-owned firms, we checked our regression results for Panels Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs). We provide the statistics for PraisWinsten regression (panel level heteroscedastic and correlated across panels) in Table 3 .
Ownership (Own), defined as a single owner owning more than 50% of equity, is significant at the 1% level. Having a Family CEO (F-CEO) is significant at the 1% and 5% levels. Having an Audit Committee (AuCom) is negatively significant at the 1% level. However, External Auditors (O-AuCom) positively influence performance at 1%. The Board Size (B-Size) is distinctly significant at the 1% level. Table 4 summarizes our results with regard to the research hypotheses. 
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Supported Supported H2 A family CEO positively affects the performance of family-owned firms.
Supported Supported
H3
The board size positively affects the performance of family-owned firms.
H4
Having outside directors on the board positively affects the performance of family-owned firms.
Rejected Rejected
H5
Having an audit committee positively affects the performance of family-owned firms.
H6
Having external auditors in the audit committee positively affects the performance of family-owned firms.
Discussion
Our research shows that family ownership, Family CEO, and Board Size all have a significant positive effect on firm performance. This supports our hypotheses and thus the literature from which we have derived the hypotheses. However, with regard to Family Ownership, we receive mixed results triggering a more detailed discussion.
In case of Family Ownership, we find positive impacts on both ROA and ROE as dependent variables. We find that equity ownership influences the risk aversion of firm management with regard to ROA (H1 supported for ROA; see also Keasey et al., 2005) . This is in line with basic agency theory relating to owner-manager conflicts (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . We also find such a positive effect on ROE (H1 supported for ROE). Thus, we disagree with Anderson and Reeb (2003) , Barontini and Caprio (2006) , Kowalewski, Talavera and Stetsyuk (2010) , Maury (2006) , and Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino (2003) , who claim that the objectives of the owner and the firm are aligned in family-owned firms. Based on our results , we assume that family-owned firms possess distinct resources such as the social capital and stewardship behavior stemming from common ancestry and shared family identity (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004) , also supporting basic stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991) . In line with Carney (2005), we suppose that such resources influence family-owned firm performance and form the comparative advantage family-owned firms have over large public corporations.
As we find that a Family CEO has a positive effect on firm performance measured by ROA and ROE (H2 supported), we fall in line with Adams et al. (2009), Anderson and Reeb (2003) , Barontini and Caprio (2006) , Hansson, Liljeblom and Martikainen (2009), and Kowalewski, Talavera and Stetsyuk (2010) , but contradict Bennedsen et al. (2007) . Relating to agency theory, we suppose that when ownership and management reside within a family, agency costs are at least low. In this regard, we refer to Fama and Jensen (1983, p. 306) , who state that "family members have advantages in monitoring and disciplining related decision agents" and disagree with Schulze et al. (2003) who attribute the reason for agency problems experienced in family-owned firms rooted in free riding.
We find that Board Size has a positive effect on both ROA and ROE (H3 supported). This supports Bokpin et al. (2006), Goodstein et al. (1994) , Abor and Biekpe (2007) , Kajola (2008) , Wynarczyk et al. (1993) , and Yermack (1996) , but contradicts Eisenberg et al. (1998) , Mak and Kusnadi (2005) , and Sanda et al. (2005) , who find that Board Size negatively affects firm performance. Based on our results, we assume that larger boards help family-owned firms in encouraging team development, facilitating inter-organizational links, and improving effective strategy making. We suppose that larger boards possess a wide range of expertise to guide the firms in making better decisions. Larger boards appear to make better use of the valuable resources and capabilities specific to family-owned firms including the overlapping responsibility of owners and managers, the sustained presence of family shareholders, entrepreneurship, and information advantages.
Concerning the Board Structure, our results shows having Outside Directors on the Board has no significant effect on ROA and ROE. In line with Brunninge, Nordqvist and Wiklund (2007), Castillo and Wakefield (2006) , Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) , and Nguyen and Nielsen (2009), we assume that Outside Directors on the Board add value in terms of cognitive diversity, relationships with external stakeholders, and independence from family matters. According to our results, having an Audit Committee negatively affects both ROA and ROE. This contradicts Kajola (2008) , who could not find a significant relationship between ROE, board composition and audit committee. However, our findings are consistent with Anderson et al. (2004) .
We show that having External Auditors has a positive influence on both ROA and ROE. We thus support Fan and Wong (2005) , who suggest that external auditors perform an important governance role. We assume that they ascertain the validity and reliability of family-owned firms' financial statements.
Contributions and Future Research
While systematically examining the effects of corporate governance factors on the performance of family-owned firms, we contribute a theoretical and empirical link between corporate governance factors relating to family ownership, family leadership, and external supervision and the performance of familyowned firms. We explain the witnessed effects on firm performance by drawing upon stewardship theory and agency. As we see the concerns of owners as stewards and managers as principals are well aligned in family-owned business, we particularly supplement stewardship theory.
We base our findings on a broad sample containing non-listed family-owned firms of varying size, industries, governance, and locations across China. For further research we suggest studying the investigated corporate governance effects in different regions. In addition, incorporating listed companies in the sample could further enhance the findings as it would allow for a more-in-depth consideration of contractual issues grounded in agency theory.
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